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Abstract 
According to the dual systems model, adolescence is a period 
of imbalance between cognitive and motivational systems that 
results in increased tendency towards risk. In the study, we 
investigated the effects of rewards on risk-taking and 
cognitive control in 90 adolescents (13-16) and 96 adults (18-
35). Our results challenge the assumptions of the model as we 
observed that rewards lead adolescents to more conservative 
decisions in one of the risk tasks used in the study. We also 
observed that in cognitive control tasks, rewards influenced 
reaction latencies, but not the efficiency of control processes. 
Keywords: risk taking strategy, cognitive control, sensitivity 
to rewards, dual systems model 
Introduction 
As a developmental period, adolescence is commonly 
characterized by risk-taking, sensation seeking, impulsivity 
and the importance of peers. Such characteristics clearly 
serve an adaptive function during the transition to 
adulthood, fostering tendencies towards independence, 
novel experiences and social networks (Spear, 2000). At the 
same time, they expose adolescents to the negative 
consequences of their actions, with typical examples being 
reckless driving, experimenting with psychoactive 
substances or unprotected sex. In our study, we investigated 
adolescent sensitivity to rewards and its consequences for 
risk-taking and cognitive control. 
The Dual Systems Model 
The dual systems model by Steinberg (2008) is one of the 
most influential propositions attempting to explain 
adolescent behavior that is well established in cognitive and 
neurodevelopmental research (Defoe, Dubas, Figner, & van 
Aken, 2015; Geier, 2013). According to the model, 
adolescence can be characterized by a functional imbalance 
between the hyperactive motivational system, responsible 
for increased sensitivity to rewards, and the still maturing 
cognitive control system, responsible for reaction inhibition 
and effective management of information. In both human 
and animal adolescents, greater sensitivity towards pleasure, 
positive feedback and rewarding effects of social 
interactions are observed (Somerville & Casey, 2010; Spear, 
2011). In humans, it has been established that early (11-13 
years old) and middle adolescence (14-16 years old) are the 
periods of highest sensitivity to rewards. The presence of 
salient incentives coupled with the immaturity of control 
processes is believed to result in increased tendency towards 
risk. 
Risk-taking, defined as a propensity towards actions ―with 
the highest outcome variability‖ (Defoe et. al., 2015), is the 
most studied consequence of adolescent sensitivity to 
rewards. More precisely, risk-taking is a preference for 
actions leading to a big gain of low probability over actions 
leading to a small gain of high probability. According to the 
dual systems model, adolescents take more risks in the 
presence of salient incentives and when they are 
emotionally aroused. Studies focusing on age differences in 
risk-taking show that adolescents do manifest stronger 
tendency towards risk than adults, but only under specific 
task demands or in specific social contexts. A meta-analysis 
by Defoe et al. (2015) revealed that in studies using 
probabilistic gambling tasks (e.g. Iowa Gambling Task, 
Columbia Card Task, Balloon Analogue Risk Task), these 
specific task demands include primarily immediate outcome 
feedback, i.e. participants are informed of their gains and 
losses immediately after each decision. In studies using fast-
paced driving tasks (e.g. Stoplight Task, driving simulators), 
it is usually the presence of a peer observer that encourages 
adolescents to take risks (e.g. Chein, Albert, O’Brien, 
Uckert, & Steinberg, 2011; Cascio et al., 2015). It seems 
unclear whether these two types of risk task measure one or 
more types of risky behavior. The use of probabilistic 
gambling tasks allow a better understanding of economic 
risk preference. In fast-paced driving tasks, the risk is more 
impulsive and more similar to everyday situations. 
Beyond the risk context, the assumptions of the dual 
systems model are tested in a rewarded vs. neutral 
antisaccade paradigm. Interestingly, some results show that 
cognitive control is enhanced in adolescents, but not in 
adults, where it is financially rewarded (Geier, Terwilliger, 
Teslovich, Velanova, & Luna, 2010; Padmanabhan, Geier, 
Ordaz, Teslovich, & Luna, 2011). Such an effect does not 
correspond to the implication of the model that adolescent 
risk-taking stems from weaknesses of control processes. 
Rather, it indicates that adolescent sensitivity to rewards can 
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in fact be adaptive and promote cognitive efficiency. 
Unfortunately, the effect seems to be difficult to replicate. 
Subsequent studies show individual differences such as 
increase, decrease or no change in cognitive control in 
adolescent response to rewards (Geier & Luna, 2012; 
Paulsen, Hallquist, Geier, & Luna, 2015). One study using 
the Continuous Performance Test showed a similar increase 
of performance in children, adolescent and adults in the 
rewarded condition (Strang & Pollack, 2014). 
The Challenges for the Dual Systems Model 
Despite the fact that the dual systems model does not 
specify whether tendency towards risk is adaptive or 
maladaptive (Strang, Chein, & Steinberg, 2013; Shulman et 
al., 2016), it is criticized mainly for its generality and the 
fact that it adopts a deficit perspective on adolescence 
(Pfeifer & Allen, 2012; Telzer, 2016). Actually, results from 
many studies contribute to the image of adolescence as the 
period of greatest lability, vulnerability to social evaluation, 
and decision making which may be suboptimal or even life-
threatening. However, a high propensity towards risk may 
not be the domain of all but the most susceptible adolescents 
(Bjork & Pardini, 2015). An interesting new development 
for the model might be offered by research demonstrating 
that adolescent sensitivity to rewards can lead not only to 
risk-taking, but can also be channeled towards safe (Cascio 
et al, 2015; Telzer, Ichien, & Qu, 2015) or prosocial 
behavior (Telzer, Fuligni, Lieberman, & Galvan, 2013; 
2014). 
The conceptualization of adolescent risk-taking within the 
model and beyond it remains, however, the most intriguing 
issue. Are adolescents impulsive risk-takers, who, due to the 
immaturities of their control processes, cannot override 
risky tendencies in the presence of salient incentives 
(Willoughby, Good, Adachi, Hamza, & Tavernier, 2013)? 
Or is risk-taking rather a decision strategy adopted 
whenever it seems profitable? When we view risk-taking as 
a strategy, we can also see adolescents as having more 
control over their behavior than is assumed in the model. 
Decision strategies can vary depending on the task and the 
type of risky behavior (e.g. economic risk, driving risk). 
Adolescent sensitivity to rewards (e.g. financial rewards, 
immediate outcome feedback) can be similar or different in 
various risk tasks. Nevertheless, it seems to be associated 
with emotional arousal. Finally, an issue worth examining is 
whether cognitive control in adolescents is indeed weaker 
than in adults and more sensitive to rewards. 
Hypotheses 
To sum up, we expected that adolescents would be more 
sensitive to rewards than adults and that the difference in 
sensitivity would manifest in more efficient cognitive 
control and a higher tendency towards risk when 
performance is rewarded. Also, as the dual systems model 
does not provide a direct link between the presence of 
reward and its possible effect on risk-taking and cognitive 
control, we hypothesized that the effect may be mediated by 
the most obvious variable: emotional arousal. 
Taking into consideration all of the above, we can 
formulate the following predictions. 
Risk (1) When rewarded according to their performance, 
people will manifest more risk-taking compared to a no- 
reward condition. 
Cognitive control (2) When rewarded, people will exhibit 
more efficient cognitive control. 
Developmental changes (3) The simple effects expected in 
hypotheses (1) and (2) will be larger for adolescents than for 
adults. 
Arousal (4) People will report higher arousal when 
rewarded according to their performance, compared to a no-
reward condition. (5) The arousal level will be a substantial 
mediator between the type of condition, risk level and 
cognitive control efficiency. 
Procedure 
The one hundred and eighty six subjects (81 men) were 
recruited either via parent-teacher conferences in local 
schools (adolescents) or online advertisements (adults) from 
two groups: adolescents (N = 90, mean age = 13.82, SD = 
0.89, range = [13, 16]), and adults (N = 96, mean age = 
25.04, SD = 4.03, range = [18, 35]). Parental consent was 
obtained for all under age participants. The study was 
conducted in schools (adolescents) and the university 
psychological laboratory (adults). Participants were 
informed that the anonymized data would be used only for 
the scientific purposes of the study and that they could ask 
questions, withdraw their participation at any moment, and 
receive performance feedback after the study was 
completed. 
The session lasted for about 90 minutes and consisted of 
two conditions, with a fifteen-minute break in between: (a) a 
set of tasks with rewards depending on the performance and 
(b) a set of tasks without any rewards. In each condition, 
participants performed four tasks, each preceded by a 
training session. Two tasks were cognitive control tasks 
(Stroop task, Antisaccade task), while the other two 
measured the tendency to take risks (Spaceride task and 
Stock Market task). The order of conditions and of the tasks 
within sets were randomized. In the middle of each 
condition (after performing two computer tasks), 
participants were asked to complete the SUPIN arousal 
scale. Therefore, each person performed four computer tasks 
and the SUPIN scale twice, once in a rewarded and once in 
an unrewarded condition. 
Participants were paid for their attendance with vouchers 
(to a clothing store, a bookstore, or a movie theatre). The 
value of the vouchers depended on performance in each task 
in the rewarded condition and varied from $5 to $15 (mean 
$10, equivalents in PLN). 
The Tasks 
The tasks were selected so as to measure different aspects of 
risk-taking and cognitive control. In contrast to the Stock 
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Market task, which investigates the tendency to make risky 
decisions based mostly on deliberative thinking, the 
Spaceride task was designed to detect the tendency to take 
risk in emotionally stimulating conditions. As two aspects 
of cognitive control, interference inhibition and response 
inhibition were measured separately by the Stroop task and 
the Antisaccade task. The SUPIN Scale was introduced to 
control the level of positive and negative affect during each 
research condition, as a possible moderator of task results. 
Stock Market The task resembles a financial game in 
which participants use virtual currency to buy shares in two 
fictitious companies. In each turn of the game it was 
possible to buy a number of shares of one or two companies 
or no shares at all. The only restriction was the amount of 
money the participant had at a given moment, which was 
shown on the right side of the screen. The participant had 60 
seconds to take a single decision, and 20 decisions to make 
during the game, which was also displayed on the screen. 
During the game the participant could see the history of 
changes of the prices of each companies’ shares displayed 
on a chart. After each decision they also saw a table 
showing the current values of stocks and how much money 
they had earned or lost so far. The price changes were 
probabilistic (independent and normally distributed). The 
expected gain (mean price change) from investing in any of 
the companies was the same; however, the variance of the 
price changes was small for one company (safe) and large 
for the other (risky). The difference between the companies 
was revealed to participants at the beginning of the task. 
Spaceride The task fulfilled a function similar to the 
―Stoplight‖ task (Chein et al., 2011), in which participants 
in a car-driving context had to quickly decide whether or not 
to take a risk to reach their destination as quickly as 
possible. The Spaceride task has the form of a game in 
which the participant controls a spaceship seen from above. 
The task was to fly as quickly as possible to the end of the 
cosmic route. There were a number of danger zones where 
there was a risk of collision with asteroid. Those zones were 
marked by a sound signal, a light on a radar, and the 
appearance of distant asteroids in the background. A cloud 
of fog also sometimes appeared and covered the spaceship 
and its surroundings, making it impossible to see asteroids 
approaching. In each danger zone, the participant had to 
decide whether to slow down and avoid a collision or speed 
ahead, risking a collision with an asteroid. A collision 
would immobilize the spaceship for longer than it would 
take to fly through a danger zone. 
Stroop task The task (Stroop, 1935) was used to evaluate 
participants’ ability to inhibit interference. In each trial of 
the task, one of four words (―red‖, ―brown‖, ―blue‖ or 
―green‖) appeared on the screen displayed in one of the four 
colors (also red, brown, blue, or green). In congruent trials 
(50% of trials), the color was the same as the meaning of the 
word (e.g. the word ―brown‖ written in brown), while in 
incongruent trails the word was written in one of the other 
three colors (e.g. the word ―red‖ written in blue, meaning 
interference was present). The participants had to press one 
of four keys corresponding to the displayed color of the 
word as quickly as possible and ignore the meaning of the 
word. To motivate the participants for a better response, a 
status bar visible on the top of the screen was additionally 
introduced. After every response the bar changed color to 
green when the response was correct, or to red when it was 
wrong. The faster the response, the shorter the bar, so the 
participant could see the accuracy and speed of every 
reaction during the game. 
Antisaccade task The task (Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 
2004) served as a measure of response inhibition. The 
participant had to inhibit the tendency to look at a sudden 
presentation of a peripheral lure stimulus and instead look at 
its mirror location in order to perceive the target stimulus 
(arrow) and correctly react to it (press one of three keys 
depending on the direction of the arrow). Feedback was 
additionally introduced in the present task to inform 
participants of their accuracy. The feedback took the form 
of a screen-wide rectangle displayed in green (in the case of 
a correct response) or red (when the reaction was wrong). 
Modified SUPIN Scale The scale (Brzozowski, 2010) was 
derived from Watson & Clark’s Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule. Both positive and negative affect were 
measured, forming two subscales of the questionnaire. The 
scale consisted of 20 adjectives describing various 
emotions. Participants indicated on a five-point Likert scale 
(from 1 – ―very slightly or not at all‖ to 5 – ―extremely‖) 
how well each adjective described their current state. On the 
basis of the results of our preliminary study, we altered 
seven items of the scale to achieve better psychometric 
characteristics. The modified version of the scale was used 
in the present study. 
Results 
Statistics and data analysis One person did not finish the 
whole set of tasks, while 60 had their results removed for 
one task due to low accuracy (in the Antisaccade task) or 
outlying value; however, their remaining results were still 
used in the analysis.  
A generalized linear mixed model using binomial 
distribution was fit to the Antisaccade task. The 
―Mediation‖ package in R was used for mediation analysis. 
Multi-factor analysis of variance with repeated measures 
was applied in all other analyses. 
Condition (rewarded or not rewarded), group (adolescents 
or adults), and interaction between condition and age group 
were independent variables. The condition factor was 
applied within subjects while the age group was applied 
between subjects. We also controlled for position in series 
(first or second) and performance in analysis concerning 
risk tasks. Dependent variables (DV) were: number of 
correct responses in the Antisaccade task; Stroop effect in 
the Stroop task; proportion of high risk stocks in all stocks 
purchased (risk measure), and number of stocks purchased 
(alternative DV) in the Stock Market task; duration of 
pressing the break button (risk measure) and duration of 
pressing the break or accelerate button (alternative DV) in 
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the Spaceride task. Alternative DV in the Spaceride task 
was logarithmized due to its skewness (γ1 =2.17 before and 
0.29 after transformation). The performance measure in the 
Stock Market task was the amount of ―money‖ in the last 
trial, and in the Spaceride task it was the negative time of 
the journey. DV in the Antisaccade task was accuracy, and 
in the Stroop task it was Stroop effect. We also examined 
reaction latencies in Antisaccade and Stroop tasks. 
Cognitive control There was neither an effect of condition 
nor an interaction between condition and age group in the 
Antisaccade task (β = 0.027, p = .47; and β = -0.03, p = .56 
respectively, deviance = 1695.8) and the Stroop task 
(F[1,136] = 0.2, p = .66; and F[1,136] = 1.75, p = .19, 
respectively, η2 = .037). However, there was a significant 
difference between adolescents and adults in reaction 
latencies in the Antisaccade task (734 ms for adolescents 
and 695 ms for adults, F[1,164] = 10,84, p = .001) and a 
nearly significant difference between conditions (707 ms for 
not rewarded and 719 ms for rewarded, F[1,152] = 3.58, p = 
.06, η2 = .19). There also was a significant difference 
between the rewarded and unrewarded condition in reaction 
latencies in the Stroop task (936 ms for unrewarded and 906 
ms for rewarded, F[1,136] = 101.97, p < .001, η2 = .12). 
Risk The performance in the Stock Market task did not 
depend on condition (F[1,180] = 0.1, p = .75), age group 
(F[1,182] = 0.59, p = .44), nor interaction between these 
two factors (F[1,180] = 1.65, p = .2, η2 = .032). Neither did 
the performance in the Spaceride task depend on any of 
these predictors (F[1,182] = 0.13, p = .72; F[1,183] = 2.52, 
p = .11; F[1,182] = 1.24, p = .27, respectively, η2 = .051). 
There also was neither effect of condition (F[1,182] = 
0.81, p = .37), age group (F[1,183] = 0.87, p = . 35), nor 
interaction between condition and age group on risk 
(F[1,182] = 0.008, p = .93, η2 = .0078) in the Stock market 
task or (F[1,182] = 0.028, p = .88; F[1,183] = 1.57, p = .21; 
and F[1,182] = 0.26, p = .61, respectively, η2 = .01) in the 
Spaceride task. 
However, there was a significant effect of condition (242 
for the unrewarded condition and 223 for the rewarded 
condition, F[1,181] = 8.96, p = .0031) and age group (200 
for adolescents and 262 for adults, F[1,182] = 18.65, p < 
.001) and a nearly significant effect of interaction between 
condition and age group (F[1,181] = 3.43, p = .065, η2 = 
.35) when alternative DV was used in the Stock Market task 
(see Figure 1), as well as an effect of interaction between 
condition and age group in the Spaceride task (F[1,182] = 
4.75, p = .031). The effect of condition or age group in the 
latter task was not significant (F[1,182] = 1.08, p = .3; 
F[1,183] = 0.44, p = .14, respectively, η2 = .019, see Figure 
2). 
Arousal The arousal differed significantly depending on 
condition (2.34 for not rewarded condition and 2.5 for 
rewarded condition, F[1, 180] = 43, p < .001, η2 = .034), but 
it was not a mediator between condition and alternative DV 
in the Stock Market task (proportion mediated = -.06, 95% 
CI = [-.44, .25], p = .63). 
 
 
Figure 1: Quantity of stock purchased in the Stock 
Market task (alternative DV) in unrewarded and rewarded 
condition for adolescents and adults. Error bars indicate 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Figure 2: Logarithm of total time for which the accelerate 
or break buttons were pressed in the Spaceride task 
(alternative DV) in unrewarded and rewarded conditions 
for adolescents and adults. Error bars indicate 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Discussion 
The first important observation made in the present study is 
that participants were sensitive to rewards in risk tasks, but 
this sensitivity leads adolescents and young adults to 
different decision strategies, depending on the context of the 
task. Adolescent decisions, however, cannot be interpreted 
as an increase in tendency towards risk, which challenges 
the assumption of the dual systems model (Geier, 2013). In 
the Stock Market task we observed that adolescents 
generally purchased less stocks than adults and the number 
of purchased stocks decreased even more in the rewarded 
condition (Fig. 1). In the Spaceride task there were no 
differences between adolescents and adults in time taken to 
press the break or accelerate button in danger zones in the 
no-reward condition. However, in the rewarded condition 
adolescents pressed the brake and accelerator buttons more 
than adults, making the difference between the groups 
significant (Fig. 2). It is interesting why the presence of 
rewards led adolescents to purchase less stocks in the 
market and steer the spaceship more boldly through danger 
zones. Possibly, when they had the opportunity to earn real 
money, participants chose a strategy that leads, as they 
believe, to better performance in the task. If purchasing 
stocks in the market is generally perceived as leading to 
both big gains and big losses—the option with ―the highest 
outcome variability‖ as Defoe et al. (2015) define risk—
then purchasing less stocks when real money is earned can 
be interpreted as a strategy that protects participants from 
loss. Otherwise, flying more boldly through danger zones 
cannot be seen as a strategy preventing collisions. It should 
be noted that while in the Stoplight task (Chein et al., 2011) 
participants decide whether to stop at a yellow light or drive 
through the crossroads, in the Spaceride task it is possible to 
brake and accelerate through the entire length of danger 
zones. Flying more boldly (such as the ―speed-brake-speed‖ 
strategy) in dangerous areas is related to maintaining high 
speed and attempting to slow down just before asteroids. 
Less bold flying is slower, but makes attempts to avoid 
collision more effective. Summing up these results, it 
appears that adolescents made more conservative decisions 
than adults in one of the tasks and more risky decisions in 
the other. The context of tasks is therefore a variable that 
determines whether adolescents manifest risk-taking or risk-
aversion. We can speculate that more conservative decisions 
could be caused by a lack of familiarity with the contexts in 
which risk can occur (e.g. economic risk). 
According to our hypothesis, participants reported higher 
emotional arousal in the rewarded condition. Such results 
suggest that the presence of a salient incentive leads to a 
greater motivational effort that manifests itself in higher 
reported arousal. We failed, however, to show that arousal 
mediates the relation between the presence of reward and 
risk-taking (or other decision strategy). As adolescents are 
viewed as impulsive risk-takers (Willoughby et al., 2013), 
the dual systems model predicts that high arousal in the 
rewarded condition enhances risk-taking because highly 
aroused adolescents cannot override risky tendencies. In our 
study, however, participants seemed to be able to make 
decisions irrespective of their arousal and did not allow it to 
negatively influence their performance. It might be the case 
that arousal leads to impulsive decision-making only in 
specific circumstances. For example, high arousal may 
trigger risk-taking only in individuals in a negative 
emotional state (such as anxiety) or under high cognitive 
load (see, e.g., Zangeneh, Blaszczynski & Turner, 2008). If 
the participants were in optimal emotional and cognitive 
state, reward-related arousal alone might not have been 
sufficient to cause a break-down in control processes and an 
increase in risk-taking. It is also possible that rewarding 
participants resulted in a higher but still optimal level of 
arousal, increasing not risk-taking, but effort. These 
explanations remain speculative and need further studies, 
but it seems that the dual systems model may oversimplify 
the proposed link between arousal and risk-taking. 
Interesting results that challenge the dual systems model 
assumptions were also observed for the cognitive control 
measures. Firstly, adolescents were less accurate and slower 
in the Antisaccade task, while no differences between 
adolescents and adults were observed in the Stroop task. 
Thus, the antisaccade task seems to be more difficult for 
adolescents, a result which is consistent with previous 
studies (Geier & Luna, 2012; Paulsen et al., 2015) showing 
that performance in the Antisaccade task improves with age. 
Secondly, we found that reward had no effect on both the 
accuracy in the Antisaccade task and the Stroop effect. 
However, in the rewarded condition participants exhibited 
longer latencies in the Antisaccade task and shorter latencies 
in the Stroop task. These results are not surprising given the 
fact that participants were informed that they were being 
rewarded for accuracy in the first task and for response 
speed in the second. The intriguing issue here is why the 
presence of rewards influenced not the measures of 
cognitive control efficiency (reaction inhibition and 
interference control), but reaction latencies in the tasks. It is 
possible that rewards enhance not a measured skill (i.e. 
control processes) that might be difficult to improve, but the 
motivational effort to do well in the task. Such an 
interpretation seems to be consistent with the effects of 
reward observed in the risk tasks, where again not the 
performance (e.g. money earned in the Stock Market, 
driving time in the Spaceride), but the decision strategies 
(e.g. purchasing more or less stocks, driving more or less 
dynamically) were enhanced. Additionally, we failed to 
observe interaction between age, condition and cognitive 
control efficiency, which is contrary to the dual systems 
model and consistent with the behavioral results of Paulsen 
et al. (2015). The effects of reward on reaction latencies in 
both tasks were similar in adolescents and adults. 
To conclude, the results obtained in the study challenge 
the assumptions of the dual systems model about the 
universality of adolescent risk-taking. Risk-taking as a 
consequence of the weakness of control processes and 
sensitivity to incentives possibly manifests itself in certain 
circumstances. In our study, adolescents made decisions 
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which cannot be considered unequivocally risky or 
impulsive, despite the rewards. Further studies should help 
determine more precisely what set of circumstances triggers 
different behavioral responses in the presence of incentives 
and thus contribute to the development of the model. 
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